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Abstract
The international role of the European Union has often been described as the one of a 
”normative power”, which has the weight to influence the minds and practices of other 
peoples by its mere attractiveness. However, Human Rights Watch’s 2007 World Report 
concludes; that even if the European Union has the credibility and the power to ‘fill the 
leadership void’ in terms of human rights advocacy in the world, it is for the moment 
‘punching well below its weight’. This study takes a closer look at the most powerful 
instrument that the Union possesses for promoting human rights on its borders, namely 
conditionality. It does so by comparing EU’s human rights policies towards Turkey, 
through the accession negotiations, and Morocco, through the ENP. What are the EU’s 
motives for engaging in these countries? How can we make sense of some of the 
similarities and differences in the European approach? And, most importantly, can these 
policies be effective in practice? 
    The conclusion suggests that EU’s power is rather limited and depends upon what is 
seriously offered in return for compliance, as well as the will to, and need for reforms in
the concerned countries. Moreover, whenever there are competing European self-
interests, the politics of values appears to fall short. 
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Introduction
Human Rights Watch’s annual world report in 2007 was named: “Filling the Leadership 
Void: Where is the European Union?” It concluded that ever since the United States 
began its so-called ‘war on terrorism’, the European Union is the only collection of states 
that is powerful and credible enough to take the lead in defending these values 
worldwide.1 The report concludes, however, that even if the European Union has the 
credibility and the power to take lead, it is for the moment ‘punching well below its 
weight’. How then could the European Union take on this task more vividly?
The most powerful instrument that the EU possesses for promoting these values is 
Enlargement, or more accurately human rights conditions of a future membership. The 
newly established European neighbourhood policy (ENP) essentially aims at copying
these effects in the relations to the Union’s surrounding neighbours, even though the 
carrot is rather flavourless.2 The aim of this study is to compare EU’s human rights 
policies towards Turkey, through the accession negotiations, and Morocco, through the 
ENP. What are the EU’s motives for engaging in the human rights situations of these 
countries? How can we make sense of some of the similarities and differences in the 
European instruments? And, most importantly, can these policies be effective in practice? 
Turkey and Morocco are both Mediterranean countries bordering to the current Union. 
Ankara is located 2514 km from Brussels, Rabat 2072 km. Morocco applied for 
membership in the European Communities in 1987, but was turned down on a 
geographical basis.3 Turkey also applied the same year, was granted candidate status in 
1999, and was accepted to begin accession negotiations in 2005. But as you will see, these 
negotiations are ‘open ended’ and highly political. The back-up plan for Turkey, that of a 
‘strategic partnership’ is not very different from what is offered to Morocco through the 
ENP. In terms of human rights, Turkey and Morocco have similar records and 
challenges. They hold equally unflattering positions in the Reporters Without Borders 
yearly ranking of 2006,4 Freedom House labels them both as ‘partly free’5 and Human 
                                             
1 Roth, K. Human Rights Watch World Report 2007. p1  
2 Kelley, J. (2006)
3 D@dalos - A chronology of European integration 1947-2001 (II)
4 Reporters sans frontières - Annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index - 2006
5 Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2007. p. 9-10
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Rights Watch included them both on its 2005 list over countries using torture.6 Therefore,
comparing them as subjects for the EU’s approach on human rights is not unfounded. 
Methodologically, this comparative study is based on text interpretations of a wide range 
of sources. The material used ranges from legal documents of the European Union, 
Commission Communications and statements by EU officials to newspaper articles. The 
reason for this is to paint a broad picture, which includes the policies in theory, as well as 
in practice. The essay is divided into three parts. The first part investigates what 
comprises ‘European Values’ and compares the different motives for convincing or 
coercing others to adhere to them. The second part takes a closer look at the most 
important method in use for fulfilling these motives, namely ‘Conditionality’. The second 
parts also compares the European approach towards Turkey and Morocco in practice, by 
considering the human rights dialogue in the field of press freedom. The final part tries to 
answer my key question: Can these policies be effective in elevating the respect of 
fundamental freedoms and Human Rights in Turkey and Morocco by generating
domestic political reforms? What are the main challenges for succeeding? For this task, I 
use a fairly simple theoretical model developed by Frank Schimmelfennig for assessing 
the effects of conditionality. His main point is that the benefits gained from compliance 
must defeat the domestic political costs, and the conditions set must be clear, 
determinate, consistent and trustworthy.7
This essay will not try to make a prognosis for whether or not Turkey will eventually 
accede to the Union, carry out a geo-philosophical discussion regarding the borders of 
Europe, or even make a comprehensive list of tensions between EU and the two 
compared countries. It should rather be seen as a way of investigating if the European 
Union actually does have any considerable weight to ‘punch with’. The conclusion 
suggests that EU’s power is rather limited and depends upon what is seriously offered in 
return for compliance, as well as the will to, and need for reforms in the concerned 
countries. Moreover, whenever there are competing European self-interests, the politics 
of values appears to fall short.  
                                             
6 Torture Worldwide (Human Rights Watch, 27-4-2005)
7 Schimmelfennig F (2007) p133
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1. ‘European Values’ and motives for advocacy
The international role of the European Union has often been described as the one of a 
”normative power” that has the weight to influence the minds and practices of other 
peoples, by its mere attractiveness.8 In order to prepare the ground for this essay, I will 
first investigate what comprises these ‘European’ (as in EU) values and norms, and 
explore some of their internal and external dimensions. Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty 
(TEU) states as follows: 
The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which 
are common to the Member States.
Compliance with these values and norms is, at least in theory, required for a state to gain 
and maintain its full rights as an EU member.9 However, these values were of limited, if 
any, concern when the early treaties of the European Community were drafted. The 
Europeans had to twiddle their thumbs until the mid 1970’s, before the European 
Parliament, the European Commission and the EU Council of Ministers accepted an 
encouragement from the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ), and 
pledged to respect these values with reference to the constitutions of member states.10
The recognition of fundamental freedoms and human rights as a cornerstone of the 
European project had to wait until the 1990’s, and the fall of Communism in Eastern 
Europe. Such considerable developments presented a need for distinguishing the Western 
European block, when there no longer was any Iron Curtain who could do the job.11 The 
prominence of common values in the Union’s core documents were however not 
apparent until 1999 and the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
In 1996, ECJ declared that the Union as an institution was unable to ratify the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms from 
1950.12 Despite such a decision, TEU expressly refers to the Convention as a canon of 
                                             
8 Haglund (2005) p. 6
9 Treaty on European Union, art. 49 and 7 respectively.
10 EU Commission: Justice and Home Affairs - The rising prominence of fundamental rights in the European 
Union Treaties
11 Haglund (2005) p. 8
12 Commission of the European Communities - The rising prominence of fundamental rights in the European 
Union Treaties
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European values.13 The ECJ’s decision from 1996 also spurred the member states to 
adopt their own EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at the Nice Summit in 2000. The not 
yet ratified European Constitution holds this Charter as its second chapter.14
The notion of a common set of values is important in the course of European integration. 
A shared ‘European Identity’ does seem to comprise a basis for generating the trust that 
institutional integration requires. However, the confirmation of this identity is essentially 
conducted in the Union’s external relations. ‘Promoting development and consolidation 
of the values set up in the treaty’; is one of the objectives set out for the crafting of a 
common foreign and security policy.15 The same goes for the seemingly separated domain 
of development cooperation.16 Since 1992 the European Community has also included a 
‘clause defining respect for human rights and democracy as essential elements of the 
relationship’ in each and every of its agreements with third countries.17 These clauses have 
first and foremost referred to the UN Universal Declaration from 1948, which is
remarkable since not all of its provisions are binding under customary international law.18
In 2001, the European Commission adopted a communication that sought to clarify the 
Union’s role in promoting human rights and democracy in third countries. The Union’s 
aim, according the communication, is to ‘uphold the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights - civil, political, economic, social and cultural - as reaffirmed by the 1993 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna’. It also recognized the Union’s potential 
impact due to its composition:
Uniquely amongst international actors, all fifteen Member States of the Union 
are democracies espousing the same Treaty-based principles in their internal 
and external policies. This gives the EU substantial political and moral weight. 
Furthermore, as an economic and political player with global diplomatic reach, 
and with a substantial budget for external assistance, the EU has both influence 
and leverage, which it can deploy on behalf of democratisation and human 
rights.19
Further, the communication referred to the EU Charter adopted in Nice 2000 as the 
standard for the Commission’s external work in order to guarantee coherence in the field 
                                             
13 Treaty on European Union Article 6(2)
14 Haglund (2005) p. 11 
15 Treaty on European Union Article 11 
16 Treaty establishing the European Communities Article 177
17 COM(2001) 252 p 4
18 Bartels, L. (2005). p. 93
19 COM(2001) 252 final  p 3-4
- 5 -
of human rights. This is remarkable since the treaty is by no means binding to any 
member states until the Constitution is ratified.
Is the spread of European values considered intrinsic? This is of course a critical question. I 
will argue that the export of these values, however intrinsic the values may be, more often 
is legitimised by their instrumental potential in achieving specific foreign policy aims.20
1.1. Enlargement
From the EU’s own perspective, enlargement, or the promise of future membership, has 
been its so far most successful foreign policy instrument.21 The former president of the 
European Commission, Romani Prodi, described it as the EU’s greatest contribution to 
“sustainable security and stability” on the European continent.22 The Commission, in its 
Enlargement Strategy paper for 2006-2007, also claimed that;
EU enlargement has helped respond to major changes such as the fall of 
dictatorships and the collapse of communism. It has consolidated democracy, 
human rights and stability across the continent. Enlargement reflects the EU's 
essence as a soft power, which has achieved more through its gravitational pull 
than it could have achieved by other means.23
Independent actors, such as Human Rights Watch, have also validated (with some 
disinclination) the positive influence of the European Accession Process on the respect 
for human rights in candidate countries.24
But what are the driving forces behind this great contribution to the continent? The 
economic benefits for ‘Old Europe’, in terms of international competitiveness and as a 
response to demographic changes, should of course not be underestimated.  However, 
the Treaty of Maastricht, and the later adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria for 
membership in 1993, marked a shift in the basis of accession from strictly economic 
criteria to an emphasis on political values.25 TEU in its present wording gives “any 
                                             
20 Haglund (2005) p15. Fischer (2004).
21 Cremona (2004) p. 4
22 Prodi R. (2002) 
23 COM(2006) 649
24 Roth, K. Human Rights Watch World Report 2007. p. 28
25 Üçer, E (2005). p 198. 
    Tallberg, J (2004). p.30
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European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1)” (see above) the right 
to apply for membership in the Union.26 It is simply not enough to be a European State
with a functioning market economy. You also have to uphold a good record of human 
rights, fundamental freedom and democracy, rule of law. Promoting these values, and 
setting them as requirements for joining the club, is connected to a notion that like-
mindedness is a pre-condition for integration. 
1.1.1. The significance of Turkey
There is a deep division between and within EU member states of whether or not Turkey 
should be allowed full membership into the Union. In fact, member states make no secret 
about such a division. There is, nevertheless, a consensus saying that it would be very 
much in line with European self-interest if Turkey saw a further democratisation and 
increased the respect for human rights to people within its territory. EU appreciates
Turkey’s capacity to contribute to regional and international stability, due to its internal 
characteristics and geographical position.27 The German Foreign minister in 2006, Frank 
Walter Steinmeier and his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gül, made a joint statement with 
regards to contemporary qualms for a ‘clash of civilizations’, saying that;
With great concern we now see how the ditch between the "west" and the 
Islamic world appears to widen ever further. Some see a "conflict of the 
civilizations” in the making. This situation worries us deeply. Because in such a 
conflict there would be no winners. We are therefore firmly committed to 
contest this development together.28
The European Commission confirms this view of Turkey as a mediator between “East” 
and “West”, but from less of a security perspective:
Turkey is at present going through a process of radical change, including a rapid
evolution of mentalities. It is in the interest of all that the current 
transformation process continues. Turkey would be an important model of a 
country with a majority Muslim population adhering to such fundamental 
principles as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law.29
                                             
26 Treaty of the European Union, Article 49
27 SEC(2004) 1202
28 Steinmeier, F. W and Gül, Abdullah (2006). The author’s translation.
29 SEC(2004) 1202
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To sum up arguments put forward by the advocators of a Turkish membership; washing 
away the label of a being a Christian club would prove Huntington wrong and, with a bit 
of luck, would create more influence and credibility for the Union in interacting with 
Middle Eastern countries. 
1.2. European Neighbourhood Policy
The European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2004 as a framework for co-
operation between the enlarged Union and the countries surrounding it.30 It does for the 
moment cover Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine. Excluded are countries currently in the process of accession negotiations and 
notably the Russian Federation.31 Enlargement is in a number of ways the rationale 
behind launching the new neighbourhood instrument. Firstly, the enlargement has 
obviously redrawn the borders of the Union and hence changed its geopolitical 
situation.32 This brought fear of new ‘dividing lines’ between the Union and its new 
neighbours, which the ENP instruments seeks to prevent.33 Secondly, it was a response to 
the EU’s relative weakness in previously promoting reform processes in neighbouring 
countries. Accordingly, ENP – documents much rather refers to the successes of 
enlargement than previous development policies directed towards the concerned 
countries.34 Presuming that the promise of future membership is “the most powerful 
stimulus for reform” the Union can think of, Romani Prodi asked in 2002;
why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and 
workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect.35
The self-interests for bringing the neighbours to an arm’s length, and more actively 
engage in their reform processes, were already confessed on the drawing board;
“..stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law along our borders are all 
fundamental for our own security.” 36
                                             
30 Kelley, J. (2006) p30.
31 Commission of the European Communities - The Policy What is the European Neighbourhood Policy.
32 Cremona, M. (2004) p.2 
33 COM(2004) 373 p. 3 
34 Kelly, J. (2006) p. 30
35 Prodi, R. (2002) p. 4
36 Solana, J. and Patten C. (2002) § 3
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Also among the European interests is the need for addressing issues such as illegal 
migration, terrorism, political extremism and international organized crime. A sustained
economic growth in the EU also requires new markets. Promoting certain values, stability
and prosperity among the European neighbours is generally legitimised by its 
instrumentality; “by helping our neighbours, we help ourselves”.37
1.2.1. The significance of Morocco
Morocco is often perceived as a relatively western orientated Arab country from the view 
of Washington or Brussels. It has seen a slow but continuous progress on ‘top-down’ 
political reform during the last fifteen years.38 Since the attacks on Casablanca in 2003 it 
has keenly joined in on the fight against terrorism39 Morocco has also been co-operative 
in the establishment of a Common European Foreign Policy and has contributed to the 
KFOR and SFOR missions on the Balkans within the scope of the European Security 
and Defence Policy. Even though Morocco is not a part of the African Union, it has been 
recognised by the EU as a possible link for Europe to gain more leverage in the 
settlements of Sub-Saharan conflicts.40
On top of this is the European interest of more effectively managing migration flows into 
Europe. In this case, Morocco plays the double role of being a country of origin, as well 
as a transit country for migrants stemming from poor and tense areas in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In July 2006, Morocco subsequently hosted the Euro-African Ministerial 
Conference on Migration and Development. The so-called ‘Rabat Action Plan’ was 
adopted, which traded ‘African cooperation in helping to restrict migration in return for 
European development assistance’.41
                                             
37 Landaburu, E. (2006)
38 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An Islamic Party Faces the Challenges of Democracy and 
Development. Event, Monday, May, 08, 2006.
39 SEC(2004) 569
40 ENPI - Morocco strategy paper 2007-2013. p.10
41 Noll, G. (2006)
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2. Conditionality
So far, this paper has focused on Union’s motives for promoting human rights as a 
European value, through Enlargement and the ENP. If this overture primarily dealt with 
the aims, the second part will take a closer look at the most important instrument that EU 
possesses for succeeding with these aims, namely Conditionality. This chapter will outline 
some of the similarities and differences in human rights conditionality, as it appears in the 
Enlargement negotiations and the ENP. Does the absence of the tastiest carrot 
necessarily lead to a softer look on Human Rights issues in neighbourhood countries that 
have no foreseeable prospect of membership? 
2.1. Enlargement and Conditionality
The use of conditionality is ‘the heart of the European Union’s enlargement’42 and serves 
a double interest. Firstly, there is the one of protecting the ‘club’ and its achievements. By 
upholding a certain level of like-mindedness, both politically and economically, the risk of 
compromising future effectiveness of the Union is lessened. Secondly, it is a foreign 
policy instrument, which is obtaining its muscle from the EU’s attractiveness in the eyes 
of its closest neighbours.43
But Conditionality is limited in time and space. Once an applicant country advances into 
full membership, the impact of conditionality is in essence lost. In theory, of course, 
already acceded member states are required to uphold this like-mindedness, and 
accordingly adhere to the conditions set up for entrance.44 In practice, however, the 
conditions set on applicant states are far more rigorous than the once set on member 
states.45 In contrast to the statute of Council of Europe, the Treaty of the European 
Union falls short of excluding members when they are not upholding a certain Human 
                                             
42 Rehn, O (2006)
43 Prodi, R. (2002)
44 Treaty of the European Union, article 7
45 Smith, K (2005) p. 109
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Rights standard.46 What are then the criteria that have be fulfilled in order to join the 
Union? 
‘European Identity’ was the only condition formally set out in the Rome Treaty of 1957.47
Shared values as a condition for accession is, however, not entirely new. In 1962 Falangist 
Spain was rejected accession to the EEC on the basis of Human Rights violations and a 
lack of democracy. In fact, the European Parliament in its so-called Brickelbach report, 
stated that a non-democratic country could not be accounted for as ‘European’, thereby 
ruling out possible accession.48 In 1967, the Community froze its association agreement 
with Greece due to the coup d’état. The relationship was neutralised in 1974, and in 1975 
Greece handed in its application for membership. The Commission recommended the 
Council to give a positive answer to the request, “due to Greece’s return to a democratic 
form of government”.49
But even if a common set of values proved important already in the 1960’s and 1970’s, in 
the first waves of enlargement the overriding focus of societal harmonisation was laid on 
markets.50 The aforementioned Opinion on the Greek application is in substance far 
more concerned of “Coordination of economic and monetary policies”, “Taxation” and 
“Free movement of capital”, than of the death penalty. Andrew Williams suggests that the 
prominent doctrine of that time was the one of “absolute non-intervention”. This 
rendered any involvement with the internal structure of a foreign state, both politically 
and legally illegitimate.51
The end of the Cold War, the 1980’s and the fall of the Soviet Union came with a 
redrawing of the European map. The waterproof division between “East” and “West” 
was discontinued. In 1991 the Community’s foreign ministers made a joint statement 
saying that, for them to recognize any of the new European states as sovereign, depended 
upon these states to respect the provision of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Act of 1975 
                                             
46 Nowak, Manfred. “Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry to, and Full Participation in, the
EU” in Alston, Phillip ed.(1999). p690. 
47 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community Article 237
48 Bartels, L (2005). European Parliament Brickelbach Report January 15 1962
49 Bartels, L (2005) Bartels p. 51. 
COM (76) 30 final. 
50 Barnes, I and Randerson, C (2006) p.354. 
51 Williams, A. (2004) p. 47
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and the Charter of Paris of 1990.52 This was an early sign on how the European 
Community would position itself towards the Eastern European countries in the 
transition phase from their Communist era.
In 1993, the European Council meeting in Copenhagen, finally adopted the famous 
‘Copenhagen Criteria’, which still form the basis for accession to the European Union. 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved (1) stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, (2) the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union. (3) Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union.53
The third criterion obliges applicants to enact the full acquis communautaire, that is the body 
of Community legislation and judgments of the European Court of Justice by which all 
EU member states are bound. So what are we to make out these formulations? Barnes 
and Randerson speak of the “Vagueness of the Copenhagen criteria”, since it gives no 
definitions to Human rights or democratisation.54 This gave the Commission some space 
for its own interpretation. The results of the Commission’s further elaboration was first 
presented in the ‘Agenda 2000’ document adopted in 1997. This document also set out 
‘good neighbourliness’ as a fourth criterion for membership.55 The Copenhagen Criteria 
in large corresponds to TEU 6(1). The only clearly substantial exception is minority 
rights, which holds a very ambiguous role in the area of European values in general, and 
in the criteria for accession in particular. If we are to understand it historically, one could 
of course look at the context of when the criteria were first adopted in 1993. At the time,
horrific wars were raging on the Balkans, clearly with an ethnic excuse. There is, however,
a great sense of disagreement among member states of whether or not minority rights 
should be included among the ‘common values’. This is manifested by the exclusion of 
such a principle in TEU 6(1). For an instance, Turkey has been criticised by the 
Commission for not adhering to the European Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities. This is while France has a general reservation to the minority 
                                             
52 Bartels, L. (2005) p. 51  
53 European Council in Copenhagen, June 21-22 1993: Conclusions of the Presidency.
54 Barnes, I and Randerson, C (2006) p. 355
55 Agenda 2000 p. 56
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protection article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and indeed 
has no intention whatsoever of ratifying the mentioned Framework Convention56. 
2.1.1. Accession Partnerships 
The Accession Partnerships are in essence tangible action plans for the concerned 
government, saying where to it should direct its efforts in order to meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria. They are decided upon by the European Council and contain principles, 
priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions for the reform process in candidate 
countries. A ‘Partnership’ is regularly revised and constitutes a corner stone in the 
Commission’s work to assess a country’s progress.57
2.2. Conditions on Turkey
The relationship between the European Union and Turkey has been a bumpy ride for a 
little more than forty years. In 1964, the parties signed an Association agreement with a 
clause making future Turkish membership possible. Ankara nonetheless had to wait until 
until 1999 when the Helsinki Council “[welcomed] the recent positive developments in 
Turkey”, and stated that
Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate States.58
An accession partnership was established in 2001 and in October 2005, Turkey finally 
opened up negotiations with the Commission. The accession partnership has been revised 
three times and constitutes the most important yardstick for the Commissions to assess 
the reform progress in Turkey. 
2.2.1. Open-ended negotiations and the larger acquis 
When the EU leaders agreed to open up negotiations with Turkey, they did so with a 
visible recollection of dubious public opinions in most Western European countries. The
establishing Framework document, states that negotiations with Turkey will be “an open-
                                             
56 Nowak, Manfred. “Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry to, and Full Participation in, the
EU” in Alston, Phillip ed.(1999). p689. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=157&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG
57 European Council Decision 2001/235
58 European Council Helsinki, December 10-11 1999: Conclusions of the Presidency. § 12
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ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand”.59 This clause 
gives verification of how political the EU-Turkey negotiations are. Some high-level 
politicians of member states have been involved in developing an alternative model of a 
“strategic partnership”, which would grant Turkey a special relation to the Union, but 
without recognition of a full membership. The Negotiation Framework from 2005 also 
provides this emergency exit:
[If] Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of
membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European 
structures through the strongest possible bond.60
A constantly ongoing debate related to the question of enlargement is the assumed 
discrepancy between “deepening” and “widening” European integration. A deepened 
integration requires trust among member states, which in turn seems to require like-
mindedness.  The treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent establishment of a European 
Union marked a “deepened” institutional co-operation. The acquis communautaire has 
swiftly expanded since then, thereby raising the bar for fulfilment of the third 
Copenhagen Criterion. If this criterion has to be fully met, acceding to the European
Union after 2004 is an exceptionally demanding task.61
2.2.2. Cultural and geographical issues
Does Turkey fulfil the most fundamental of all conditions, the one of ‘European identity’? 
Asking such a question could of course ignite an interesting geo-philosophical discussion 
about the borders of Europe. Is Europe in essence an idea, or simply a geographical area? 
Even if the independence war after the collapse of Ottoman Empire was fought against 
Western states, the agenda of revolutionist leader Kemal Atatürk was to create a secular 
and modern, in many ways Western, state. From the accessions to Council of Europe in 
1949, NATO in 1951 and OECD in 1961, one could question if the Turkish nationalist 
movement was much of a dissociation from the European way?62
This discussion may be important with regards to the political game that eventually will 
determine the outcome of the “open-ended negotiations”, but the question appears
already decided upon by the mere opening of negotiations. Turkey is, as the Helsinki 
                                             
59 EU – Turkey Negotiation Framework (2005) p2
60 ibid
61 Barnes, I and Randerson, C (2006)
62 Üçer, E. (2006)
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Council of 1999 made clear; “a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of 
the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States”.63
There are no historical, religious and cultural conditions for accession to the European 
Union. The early rejection of Spain in 1967 because of lacking a ‘European Identity’,
would rather suggest that eventually fulfilling the political criteria for accession is what in 
essence defines the label ‘European’.
2.3. Freedom of expression in Turkey
Turkey holds an unflattering 98th place in ‘Reporters sans frontièrs’ Worldwide Press 
Freedom Index Ranking of 2006.64 During this year, more than 50 people were indicted 
for statements, articles or speeches that touched upon controversial topics such as the 
life’s work of Kemal Atatürk, the army’s political influence or the Armenian genocide.65
This could be illustrated by the destiny of Hrant Dink, editor of the Armenian weekly 
newspaper Argos. He received a six-month suspended sentence in 2005 for portraying
Turkish ‘blood’ as ‘dirty’. The sentence was imposed under the notorious article 301 of 
the Turkish Criminal Code, which reads:
1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six 
months and three years.
2. Public denigration of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial 
institutions of the State, the military or security structures shall be punishable 
by imprisonment of between six months and two years.
3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen 
in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third.
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.66
Apart from Hrant Dinks suspended sentence, he received several death threats from 
ultranationalists, one of which was realised in broad daylight on January 19, 2007.67
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Press freedom has been of quite extensive concern for European officials. The 
Commissioner for Enlargement in 2006, Olli Rehn, said that he expected ‘the government 
to take the initiative to change [article 301] without delay’68. The first EU Accession 
Partnership held as a short-term priority for Turkey to:
Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of 
expression in line with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. Address in that context the situation of those persons in prison
sentenced for expressing non-violent opinions.69
The Union’s efforts have been reinforced by diplomatic contributions from the Council 
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights.70
From Ankara, the response to Brussels and Strasbourg has been conforming, at least in 
words. The leading AKP party claims that: 
The freedoms of thought and expression shall be built up on the basis of 
international standards, thoughts shall be freely expressed, and differences shall 
be regarded as an asset.71
Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül have in 
different contexts during 2006 promised to reconsider the wording of the Turkish 
Criminal Code. Representatives of Turkish civil society have also been invited to 
discussions regarding the wording of a future law, which would be more in harmony with 
Turkey’s international obligations.72 However, it is uncertain whether or not these efforts 
will have any effect in practice or if they are but plain lip service. 
2.4. Conditionality and the ENP
The success of Conditionality in the enlargement process has been dependent upon the 
prospects of future membership. With exception for countries like Ukraine, for which it 
could be springboard into future accession negotiations, this incentive is lacking in the 
Neighbourhood policies. Therefore, before investigating the use of conditionality it must 
be clarified what the EU has to offer instead73. 
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Romani Prodi said in 2002 that “ENP offers everything but institutions”. What 
everything in this particular case comprises is primarily a move beyond co-operation into 
actual integration, bringing 
neighbouring countries fully into the internal market and other relevant EU 
policies.74
This wording is similar to the definition of a ‘strategic partnership’, which was discussed 
earlier as an alternative to full membership for Turkey. 
Besides economic and financial integration, the ENP carrot includes for an example 
“closer links” concerning culture, education, environmental policies, technique and 
science, as well as financial assistance in order to move ahead with the reform process.75
But does the carrot appear as lucrative as intended, if the integration excludes the 
possibility for neighbours to influence the rules for the programmes of which they are a 
part? This question was in way answered by Prodi, as he did not close the door for 
establishing new institutions with the surrounding neighbours.76
When the European Neighbourhood Policy instrument was drafted, the ambition was to 
develop what Prodi characterized as “Copenhagen proximity criteria”. These would set 
out clear benchmarks as conditions for further integration. In the finally adopted Strategy 
paper for the ENP, such ambitions were lessened and replaced by a gradual approach.77
The ambition and the pace of development of the EU’s relationship with each 
partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as 
well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities78.
This language would suggest that the ambition of ENP in the sphere of values, is rather 
about making common values more common, than trying to impose a certain set of 
European standards. This is of course a modified truth. The direction of movement is 
outspokenly “approximation with EU legislation”. However, there is no doubt 
whatsoever that the tone is softer. As the values cannot be imposed, they have to be 
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convinced.79 This is logically due to the smaller incentives, and the ENP’s design of a 
joint ownership. With such an arrangement, it is indeed a lot easier to use the carrot 
instead of the stick. The EU Commissioner for External Affairs and Neighbourhood
policies, Benita Ferrero Waldner, also confirmed this ‘Rewarding’ version of 
Conditionality: 
It’s true that there’s an element of conditionality involved. But it is positive
conditionality, meaning that we will offer more (financial assistance, technical
dialogue, or transfer of best practice) as progress is made80.
2.4.1. Association Agreements and Action Plans
In order to understand the human rights dialogue between EU and Morocco it has to be 
noted that the ENP builds upon previous ‘Association Agreements’, which comprises the 
legal framework for European engagement. The EU – Morocco Association Agreement 
entered into force in 2000 and falls within the broader context of the ‘Barcelona Process’, 
launched in 1995 for advancing relations between the Union and its Mediterranean 
neighbours.81 The Association agreement holds a general human rights clause in art. 2 
with the wording; 
Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights 
established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights shall inspire the 
domestic and external policies of the Community and of Morocco and shall 
constitute an essential element of this Agreement.82
Since this is the only legal framework, this is subsequently the only definite human rights 
condition for the EU-Moroccan relationship.  
But the Association Agreement is elaborated through the so-called ‘Action Plans’, which 
is the ENP - equivalent of the ‘Accession partnerships’. These are designed in a similar 
manner with short-, medium- and long-term priorities for political reform, ‘whose 
fulfilment will bring the partnering country closer to the Union’.83 A fundamental 
different is the aforementioned ‘Joint Ownership’. This reveals that they are developed in 
dialogue with each and every country comprised by the ENP. This gives an opportunity 
for individual states to move beyond earlier association agreements, such as the ‘regional’
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Euro-Med agreement, in to more individual relationship with EU. This particularized
approach is pursuant to the important concept of ‘differentiation’, which emerged in the 
late 1990’s in the Enlargement process. Candidate countries had previously been dealt 
with group wise by the Union. This ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy was considered ineffective 
and unfair but proved difficult to alter in practice, as can be noted by the simultaneous 
accession of ten countries in 2004.84 Besides, ‘differentiation’ also aims at creating a wider 
imbalance between the united EU Member States one the one side, and the lonely 
neighbour on the other.85
2.5. Freedom of Expression in Morocco
Morocco holds an equally unflattering 97th place in the ‘Reporters sans frontièrs’ ranking 
of 2006.86 Media criticism of authorities is often quite frank, but is severely restricted by a 
press code that threatens with imprisonment for anyone who is disrespectful of ‘Islam, 
the institution of the Monarchy, or the territorial integrity’.87 In 2005, the weekly 
magazine Al Ousbouia Al Jadida published an interview with Nadia Yassine, an unofficial 
spokesperson of the Moroccan Justice and Charity party, where she said that the 
‘monarchy did not suit Morocco’ and that its institution was collapsing. Accordingly, the 
weekly’s editor, Abdelaziz Koukas, was charged for ‘damaging the monarchic regime’ and 
was sentenced to at least three years in prison and a noticeable fine.88 These rules also 
comprise foreign media seeking accreditation in the country. For an instance, Lars Björk, 
a Swedish photographer was arrested in the Western Saharan capital El Aaiún in February 
2007, after photographing a demonstration in support for the pro-independence 
movement Polisario. He was said to lack the formal accreditation and was subsequently 
expelled to Agadir.89
The 2004 EU Action Plan for Morocco at least suggests that the topic has been touched 
upon in bilateral talks. One short-term priority reads:
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– Exchange experience and know-how in relation to development of the 
Press Code.90
These wording can clearly illustrate the softer approach that the design of a ‘Joint 
Ownership’ appears to require. Nevertheless, the 2006 progress report indicates that there 
is an amendment to the Press Code in the working, which at least would save journalists 
from imprisonment.91
2.6. The Alternative method: Socialization 
The idea of Socialization in international politics is that creating close links with the 
government, civil society and the private sector of another country will eventually lead 
to change in that country’s behaviour, at least if there is an imbalance of power in your 
favour. This softer concept is less controversial than conditionality, since it preserves the 
autonomy of the foreign country. Socialization should not be seen as something 
fundamentally different from Conditionality in this case, since they are both used 
simultaneously and somewhat intertwined in the Enlargement process and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. This essay will not touch upon the subject any further, but it 
could be held in mind for making the picture more complex.92
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3. Challenges to effectiveness
For this part a fairly simple model for assessing the effectiveness of political conditionality
will be used. Frank Schimmelfennig gives certain criteria that have to be fulfilled in order 
for Conditionality to be effective. The benefits gained from compliance must defeat the 
domestic political costs, and the conditions set must be clear, determinate, consistent and 
trustworthy.93 In other words; the incentives for Europeanising the reform process must 
be more lucrative than the domestic risks are frightening. Moreover, the European Union 
must be credible and consistent in what it is demanding. This model will be used as a 
disposition when trying to identify some of the main challenges for the Union to increase 
the enjoyment of Human Rights in the Turkish and Moroccan societies. The list of 
challenges included in this chapter should not be seen as exhaustive or undisputed. It 
might be fairly skewed what is defined as a challenge or an incoherence. 
3.1. The intensity and scope of the rewards for compliance
Schimmelfennig’s article investigates the successes and shortcomings of Western 
European organizations’, such as the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and Nato, use of 
Conditionality on countries applying for membership. He concludes that the successes of 
Conditionality depend upon the attractiveness of the membership, which has to be 
perceived as invaluable in terms of military or economic self-interest. In Eastern Europe 
the EU and Nato have been able to combine their attractiveness by negotiating
membership simultaneously.94
3.1.1. Turkey
Following the 2002 general elections in Turkey, the climate for moderate political reform 
was uniquely hospitable. This could be illustrated by the concentrated ratifications of 
international human rights instruments: International Convention Against Every Form Of 
Racial Discrimination (Sep 16 2002), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Sep 23 2003), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Sep 23 
2003)95, Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
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and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Nov 12
2003).96
These examples of ratifications mirror the 2001 Accession Partnership priorities in the 
field of human rights. For an instance; ‘Abolish the death penalty, sign and ratify Protocol 
6 of the European Convention of Human Rights’97 was stated as a mid-term priority. 
Turkey’s decision to comply and hence abolish the death penalty, saved the life of PKK 
leader Abdullah Öcalan, whose penalty was transformed into life imprisonment98.
How are we then to understand these reforms? From the EU point of view we could 
certainly highlight the promise made by the Helsinki Council in 1999 and the eventual 
establishment of an Accession Agreement in 2001. These gave clear indications to Turkey 
that membership simply depended upon the Turkish performance to meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria. However, this image could be balanced by domestic Turkish politics 
in early days of the 21th century. The 2002 elections were held with the backdrop of a
severe earthquake in 1999, and an equally severe economic crisis in 2001, the latter of 
which held centrality in the election campaigns. If there was a consensus on any issue 
among Turkish parties, it was the need for reform. This served a convenient linkage to 
the debate about an eventual EU membership and the political transformation that it 
would require.99 In 2002 there also proved to be a strong popular opinion, generally 
exceeding 60%, in favour of a future accession to the Union. In short, moderate political 
reform came with multiple layers of rewards. Firstly, it mirrored the conditions set from 
Brussels; secondly, it was in line with popular opinion, and thirdly; it provided a possible 
path out of the domestic economic crisis.100
3.1.2. Morocco
In the Southern Mediterranean countries, the ‘scope and intensity of inclusion’ through
the ENP has been disappointing. The incentives offered in practice do not mirror the 
ones set out in Actions plans, and especially not the ones asked for by the neighbours 
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themselves. A greater access for agricultural products into the European market and a 
softer regime with regards to ‘work visas’ are a couple of rewards that have been lacking 
in the eyes of the Moroccan government. Besides, the recent enlargement of the Union
has brought a general shift in Brussels’s focus – emphasising the prosperity of Eastern 
Europe rather than that of the Southern Mediterranean countries.101
Hence, Schimmelfennig’s prognosis for the ENP in achieving political reform is 
unsurprisingly quite muted. Moroccan officials has nevertheless indicated an eagerness to 
deepen the integration with the European Union, especially in the economical sphere. 
However, the vagueness of what the Union in fact offers, has not lead Moroccan officials 
to restructure like there was no tomorrow.102
3.2. The domestic political costs for compliance
The costs for steering the reform process to align with the European Union’s wishes and 
demands varies among countries, and is largely dependent upon the political system of the 
candidate or neighbour. In countries where a majority of the power is concentrated to the 
executives, the costs of compliance are indeed a lot higher than in a multi-party state, 
taking into account the revolutionlike transformation that such an adoption would 
require.103 It is one of the necessary elements of politics that the ones in power are 
reluctant to give it up. In an ‘unfree’ or ‘partly free’ country, risking your place in office is 
obviously a huge step to take, compared to a ‘free’ society where your authority is 
threatened on daily basis. 
Judith Kelley argues that respect for Human rights and fundamental freedoms in Eastern 
European states, that gained membership in the EU in 2004, were notably higher in 1993, 
than the enjoyment in ENP countries 2003.104 This indicates a lower starting point in 
terms of ‘shared values’ for the ENP countries today, compared to previous candidate 
countries ten years ago. Accordingly, the political costs for complying are higher. 
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3.2.1. Turkey
The EU Human Rights report from 2006 gave a mixed grade to the Turkish reform 
progress: 
Political transition in Turkey is ongoing and the country continues to 
sufficiently fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria; however, the pace of change 
has slowed in 2005 and implementation remains uneven.105
Why did the reform process slow down simultaneously as the negotiations were initiated?
One explanation could lie in the tough approach from EU leaders while eventually 
deciding to open up negotiations in Paris 2004. The Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip 
Erdogan could not understand why EU did not greet Turkey with open arms. He was 
evidently disappointed after the summit, especially due to the clause labelling the 
negotiations as ‘open-ended’ and the tough conditions set on the Turkey in solving the 
issue of Cyprus.106 European leaders, echoing sceptic public opinions, also began stressing 
the painful history of the Armenian genocide. Paradoxically, the grave between Europe 
and Turkey appeared deeper and wider than ever, turning up the costs for building 
bridges to an unprecedented level. From the Turkish point of view, the official direction 
is still towards Brussels, but in 2005 political reform ‘became luxurious items on the 
Agenda’. Clashes with Kurdish guerrilla PKK, the neighbouring war in Iraq and domestic
politics, not least concerning the 2007 elections, took precedence before efforts to meet 
the Copenhagen criteria.107 Mentioned in the EU Progress reports, and which also 
became painfully obvious in the 2007 elections, is the political role of the Turkish military. 
The Nobel Prize Laureate in literature 2006, Orhan Pamuk, told German newspaper Die 
Welt in 2005; 
I do not see the AKP [ Erdogans party] as a danger for the Turkish democracy, 
unfortunately it is rather the military, which at times prevents a democratic 
development..108
In the case of Turkey, the main challenge for international actors, primarily the European 
Union, is apparently to deal with the roughly independent army, that has appointed itself 
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the guardian of Turkish secularism109. How could the Union address military leaders that 
are in a doubtful level of loyalty towards Ankara? What side effects would come with a 
tougher approach from the political leadership? 
3.2.2. Morocco
As for the Mediterranean countries some concern have been brought forward of whether 
a rapid democratisation really is in line with European interests. There is an assumed 
discrepancy between long-term democratisation and short-term stability. A rapid 
democratisation might open up for extremists parties. The 2006 election in the Palestinian 
territories serves as a deterring example, where Islamist Hamas succeeded in the most 
European of all occurrences, namely a fair election.110
As been noticed before, Morocco is often perceived as an ideal Muslim country in eyes of 
‘Western’ policy makers. It was the first Arab country that officially admitted state 
involvement in Human Rights abuses during the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s. More than 20 000 
cases have been investigated and victims or their families have had the chance to testify in 
public hearings. A new Family code, that recognises a wider scope of rights to women, 
has also been adopted. However, the reforms have always been top-down and dependent 
upon the endorsement of the King.111 This poses a limit on how far the reform process 
will range, and ties it to Sa Majesté le Roi, Muhammed VI, in person. The question is 
whether the passed reforms will be enough to create ‘an institutional ground’ for further 
and more thorough democratic reforms, or if the aforementioned limits set on freedom 
of expression are fixed. 
3.3. The credibility of the actor that is setting the conditions 
Even though the European Union is striving for coherent policies in all areas, reality is 
often distorted by competing self-interests, differences in opinion among and within 
states, as well as negative side effects by the methods in use. 
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3.3.1.  Competing national interests 
Challenging to European efforts is the existence of competing national interests among 
EU member states. Given that 46 % of the Union’s 2005 budget was reserved for 
agriculture,112 it is hardly surprising that the Union is reluctant to allow greater access for 
Moroccan agricultural products into the European market. Recalling the promise of 
‘everything but institutions’ makes the Moroccan disappointment understandable. In 
terms of human rights, this part highlights three specific issues that limit the EU’s 
credibility in promoting Human Rights in Morocco. 
First, there is the ever-occurring dispute over Western Sahara, which has been claimed by 
the Moroccan government since 1976. These claims were met by armed resistance from 
the Sharawi pro-independence movement Polisario. In 1991 a cease fire was established 
and later diplomatic efforts resulted in the ‘Baker Plan’ and the UN peace keeping force 
Minurso. The UN ambition is to let the Sharawi people themselves decide whether or not 
they should enjoy independence or be granted official international status as a part of 
Morocco. Such a referendum, echoing the Sharawi people’s right to self-determination, has 
proved impossible due to severe resistance from the Moroccan government. There has 
also been some differences in opinion regarding who should be allowed to vote.113 The 
European Union has in its Common Foreign Policy rhetoric remained committed to the 
UN plan, which was reiterated by a statement in the General Assembly’s Fourth 
Committee in 2005:
[The European Union] supports efforts to find a just, lasting and mutually 
acceptable political solution, which will allow for the self-determination of the 
people of Western Sahara, as envisaged by the Security Council.114
With this statement considered, it is remarkable that the European Parliament agreed to 
sign a Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Morocco in May 2006 that grants fishers 
from European countries quotes outside the coast of Western Sahara. All proposed 
amendments to the agreement that would except the waters south of the 27.4 degree line, 
failed. The agreement is the most valuable of its kind and is especially lucrative for 
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Spanish and Portuguese fishers115. Geography may therefore be a more important reason 
than ideology for why the Swedish government was the only spirited opponent of the 
agreement. This is an example of where a European self-interest beats European Values 
as a priority in the bilateral relationship with a third country. 
The second issue is the one of fighting illegal immigration from northern and Sub 
Saharan Africa into Europe. The aforementioned ‘Rabat Plan’ from 2006 decided upon 
joint European and African efforts to tackle the most delicate side-effect of European 
attractiveness. Professor Gregor Noll, claims that this summit could be remembered as 
the day when African governments traded their citizens ‘right to leave’ for conditional 
development assistance. This is remarkable since this specific right to ‘vote with your feet’ 
has previously been strongly defended by the Western block during the Cold War.
As a result, the Mediterranean "Berlin wall" made of water and razor wire will 
persist, and proliferate in the African continent. Poverty in Africa will persist, 
and so will violations of human rights. The only thing that will diminish as a 
result is the exit options of Africans.116
The third issue I wish to highlight in the European Neighbourhood policy is the one of 
historical ties. When accession negotiations began with Eastern European countries in the 
middle of the 1990’s, the European Union could start off from a relatively clean sheet. 
The Iron Curtain had rendered it impossible to engage in the internal structures of, for an 
instance, Poland or Czech Republic. The relations with the Southern Mediterranean 
countries were categorically different. The European Communities established its first 
Co-operation agreement with Morocco in 1976.117 Accordingly, there have been several 
of opportunities in the past for promoting European Values. Therefore, one could ask if 
the European Union really offers anything new to the Southern Mediterranean countries, 
and if the ‘sudden’ idea of engaging more deeply in the reform process will have any fair 
chance of succeeding. 
3.3.2. Keeping the deal?? 
Historical relations are also infecting the EU credibility towards Turkey. As has been 
noted, the possibility of an eventual membership in the Union was first seen in 1964. The 
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EU closed the door in 1987 and there are no guarantees saying that history won’t repeat 
itself:
EU–Turkish relations have tended to follow the pattern of a ritual dance, with 
the prospect of Turkish accession to the Union periodically pulled out of the 
conjuror’s hat only to disappear almost immediately back up his sleeve. This is a 
good trick to begin with, but becomes progressively less so as it is repeated 
again and again. This pattern of hope, disappointment and rejection has 
become a dominant feature of Turkey’s relationship with the EU, and in the 
past two years the cycle seems to have repeated itself yet again.118
There seems to have been some intended ambiguousness in the European approach to 
Turkey. But for how long can this limbo be effective? If the European Union lacks a 
level of trustworthiness in what it is offering in return for a Europeanization of the 
internal political structure, how is it then to succeed? 
Given the consensus among EU member states on having a stable and democratic 
Turkey, at least strongly anchored to the Union,119 and given the perception of the 
Enlargement as its most successful foreign policy instrument, one could wonder if 
closing the door would serve European self-interests.
3.3.3. The inherent contradictions of Conditionality 
A general dilemma when applying conditions in the realm of international integration is 
how to reward compliance in certain areas, while there is simultaneous non-compliance 
in others. This requires the EU Commission and member states to rank the values it is 
promoting. Should positive developments in terms of minority rights be considered more 
important in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria than ensuring Children’s or Women’s 
Rights? This is of particular concern in the execution of a new neighbourhood policy. 
Integration amounting to the ‘degree values are shared’ overlooks the problem that the 
sharing of some values may increase simultaneously as the sharing of others may 
decrease. 
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Another dilemma is the way ‘Accession’ or ‘Association’ talks are conducted. The 
Commission’s interlocutor is generally the executive powers of the concerned state, a 
conduct which rather endorses than opposes top-down reforms120
Conclusion
Promoting human rights as a European values through the Enlargement and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy is in general legitimised by an enlightened self-interest. 
First, like-mindedness is considered a precondition for integration and second, shared 
values is seen as a guarantee for stability and security. In the case of Turkey, EU members
often articulate the importance of avoiding a ‘clash of civilizations’. In the case of 
Morocco, engaging in the political reform process is in general motivated by controlling 
migration into Europe. 
For the promotion of human rights as a European value, the most powerful and 
successful instrument that the Union possess is the use of conditions for granting a 
specific reward, ultimately membership. In the case of Turkey, the conditions are set out 
in the so called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ from 1993, and specified through the regularly 
revised ‘Accession Partnerships’. As for Morocco and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, the aim was originally to create similar ‘Copenhagen proximity criteria’, which 
would have to be met in order for a neighbourhood country to move ‘fully into the 
internal market and other relevant EU policies’. However, due to the lack of strong 
incentives and the joint character of the bilateral ‘Action Plans’, this ambition was given 
up for a gradual approach. The degree of commitment to shared values will instead match 
the degree of integration. In other words, the approach towards Morocco is unmistakably 
softer.
Following the Turkish elections in 2002, an intensive reform process was initiated in the 
country. Was the prospect of an EU membership and the conditions set for it in any way 
behind this? Well, first there was the ‘promise’ given in 1999, saying that Turkey’s 
accession depended upon its ‘own merits’. Second, the Turkish economic crisis in 2001 
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created space for reforms, and finally the public opinion was strongly in favour of a move 
to the west. The later scepticism in Europe characterised by the ‘open ended clause’ in the 
2005 negotiation framework, and newly articulated in the French election campaign 2007 
has severely shaken the trustworthiness of what EU really offers Turkey in exchange for 
human rights compliance. This is also reflected in the decline of popular support in 
Turkey. One could wonder if the ‘fear of the Turk’ is in line with European self-interest. 
As for the European Neighbourhood Policy, the most important task ahead for the 
European Union must be to paint a clear and trustworthy picture of what ‘everything but 
institutions’ really means. It is evident that what is asked for in neighbouring countries, in 
exchange for compliance with the priorities set out in the action plans, is commonly in 
conflict with European interests. This is particularly true when regarding the Moroccan 
wishes for a better access for agricultural products into the European market. The 
Kingdom of Morocco, is a relatively western oriented Arab country. King Muhammed VI 
(1999- ) has shown a keen interest in elevating respect for certain human rights. But there 
are set limits; regarding the monarchy, religion and the territory; for how thoroughly the 
reform process can evolve in a foreseeable future. The European Union could perhaps, at 
best, tip the balance in favour of likeminded reformists. But as for the right to self-
determination of the Sharawi people in Western Sahara, or the ‘right to leave’ for 
individuals within Moroccan territory, conflicting European policies is rather more likely 
to decrease respect for these ‘European values’. 
- 30 -
References
Alanyali, Iris Meine Großmutter stiftete zehn Lira. Die Welt Oct 20, 2005. 
http://www.welt.de/print-
welt/article172021/Meine_Grossmutter_stiftete_
zehn_Lira.html. (May 24 2007).
Amnesty International Public Statement. Turkey: Article 301 
is a threat to freedom of expression and 
must be repealed now!
1 December 2005
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur44
0352005. (May 24 2007).
Aydın, Senem and Çarkoğlu, 
Ali
EU Conditionality and Democratic 
Rule of Law in Turkey
Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, 
and the Rule of Law. Working paper 2006
Barnes, I. & Randerson, C. EU enlargement and theeffectiveness of 
conditionality:keeping to the deal?
Managerial Law, Vol. 48 No. 4, 2006  pp. 351-
365
Bayefsky.com Turkey Ratification History http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/turkey_t1_ratific
ations.pdf (May 24 2007).
Baylis, John and Smith, Steve
(ed.)
The globalization of world politics : an 
introduction to international relations 
2ed. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001
BBC News Turkish-Armenian writer shot dead Friday January 19 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6279
241.stm (May 24 2007).
BBC News Q&A: Common Agricultural Policy Friday  December 2 2005: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4407
792.stm (May 24 2007).
BBC News Army 'concerned' by Turkey vote April 28 2007; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6602
375.stm. (May 24, 2007)
Çarkoğlu, Ali Who Wants Full Membership? 
Characteristics of Turkish Public 
Support for EU Membership
Turkish Studies, 4:1, 171 – 194. 2003
Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 
An Islamic Party Faces the Challenges 
of Democracy and Development. 
Remarks by Carothers, Thomas.
Event, Monday, May, 08, 2006. 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/ind
ex.cfm?fa=print&id=883. (May 24 2007).
Carneige Endowment for 
International Peace 
Is There Still a Political Reform 
Agenda in the Middle East? Remarks 
by El-Hariry, Khalid
Tuesday, February 6, 2007. 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/ind
ex.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=948&&prog=zgp&pr
oj=zdrl,zme. (May 24 2007).
- 31 -
Commission of the 
European Communities
Communication on the European 
Union’s Role in promoting human 
rights and democratisation in third 
countries.
(2001) 252 final
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Communication on Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 –
2007
COM(2006) 649
Commission of the 
European Communities
Commission Staff Working document -
Issues arising from Turkey's 
membership perspective 
SEC(2004) 1202
Commission of the 
European Communities
The Policy What is the European 
Neighbourhood Policy
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm. 
(May 24 2007)
Commission of the 
European Communities
Communication on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper
COM(2004) 373 final
Commission of the 
European Communities
Commission Staff Working document -
European Neighbourhood Policy -
Country Report Morocco
SEC(2004) 569, May 12 2004
Commission of the 
European Communities
Opinion on Greek Application for 
Membership. 
Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 2/76; COM (76) 30 final, 20 January 
1976.
Commission of the 
European Communities
Agenda 2000 - For a stronger and 
wider Union
Document drawn up on the basis of COM (97) 
2000 final, 13 July 1997. 
Commission of the 
European Communities
ENP Morocco progress report 2006. (SEC(2006) 1511/2
Commission of the 
European Communities
The EU's relations with Morocco -
Overview
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/morocco
/intro/index.htm. (May 24 2007).
Commission of the 
European Communities
The rising prominence of fundamental 
rights in the European Union Treaties
http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/right
s/treaties/fsj_rights_treaties_en.htm (May 24 
2007)
Commission of the European 
Communities
ENP; EU/Morocco Action Plan 
2004
- 32 -
Council of Europe Turkey - Treaties signed and ratified or 
having been the subject of an accession 
as of 26/5/2007 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/Lis
teTraites.asp?PO=TUR&MA=999&SI=2&DF=
&CM=3&CL=ENG (May 24 2007).
Council of the European 
Union and the Commission 
of the European 
Communities
EU Annual Report on Human Rights 
2006
Cremona, Marise The European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Legal and Institutional Issues
Stanford Center on Democracy, Development 
and the Rule of Law. Working paper no.25. 2 
November 2004
D@dalos A chronology of European integration 
1947-2001 (II)
http://www.dadalos-
europe.org/int/materialien/chronologie2.htm 
(May 24, 2007)
EU Presidency EU Presidency Statement – Question 
of Western Sahara
October 11 2005: New York. Fourth Committee 
(Special Political and Decolonization Affairs). 
http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_5123_en.htm (May 24 
2007).
European Council 
Copenhagen, June 21-22 
1993
Conclusions of the Presidency
European Council Helsinki, 
December 10-11 1999
Conclusions of the Presidency
European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument
Morocco Strategy Paper 2007 - 2013
European Parliament Rapport fait au nom de la commission 
politique sur les aspects politiques et 
institutionnels de l'adhésion ou de 
l'association à la Communauté par M. 
Willi Birkelbach Rapporteur.
Services des publications des Communautés 
européennes, 15.01.1962. 20 p. ISBN 
2837/2/62/2. (Assemblée parlementaire 
européenne, Documents de séance 1961-1962, 
Document 122).
European Parliament Press 
Service
Morocco Fishing Agreement gets 
Parliamentary approval
May 16 2006; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/archive/d
efault_en.htm. (May 24, 2007)
Ferrero Waldner, Benita The European Neighbourhood 
Policy:bringing our neighbours closer
Speech at the 10th Euro-Mediterranean 
Economic Transition Conference Brussels, 6/6
2006 SPEECH/06/346
Fischer, Joska Rede von Bundesaußenminister Fischer 
zum EU Beitritt der Türkei vor dem 
2004
- 33 -
Deutschen Bundestag
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2007 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_r
elease/fiw07_charts.pdf
Haglund Morrissey, A. Exploring the export of European 
Union values : the European 
neighbourhood policy 
Växjö : Institutionen för samhällsvetenskap, 
Växjö univ., 2005
Hammarberg, Thomas Human rights development in Turkey. 
Letter addressed to Mr Mr. Abdullah 
Gül Turkish Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs
December 18 2006. 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1105025&
BackColorInternet=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet
=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679 (May 24 
2007).
Human Rights Watch Torture Worldwide (Human Rights 
Watch, 27-4-2005)
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/27/china
10549.htm (May 24 2007)
Human Rights Watch Country Summary : Turkey January 2007. 
http://hrw.org/wr2k7/pdfs/turkey.pdf. (May 24 
2007).
Human Rights Watch Country Summary : Morocco January 2007. 
http://hrw.org/wr2k7/pdfs/morocco.pdf. (May 
24 2007).
Kelley, J. New Wine in Old Wineskins: 
Promoting Political Reforms through the 
New European Neighbourhood Policy
JCMS 2006 Volume 44. Number 1. pp. 29–55
Kınıklıoğlu, Suat. Turkey's impending disorientation . Turkish Daily News Feb 07, 2006
Landaburu, Eneko From Neighbourhood to Integration
Policy: are there concrete alternativesto 
enlargement?
Speech at CEPS Conference “Revitalising 
Europe”
Brussels, January 23, 2006.
Magen, Amichai The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the
European Neighbourhood Policy
Achieve Compliance?
Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, 
and The Rule of Law. Working paper no. 68. 
August 2006
Noll, Gregor The Euro-African migration conference: 
Africa sells out to Europe
July 14, 2006 - openDemocracy Ltd. 
http://193.41.101.59/content/articles/PDF/373
8.pdf (May 24 2007).
Prodi, R. ‘A Wider Europe – A Proximity 
Policy as the Key to Stability’.
Speech to the Sixth ECSA-World Conference, 
Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, SPEECH/02/619.
- 34 -
Redmond, John Turkey and the European Union:
troubled European or European 
trouble?
International Aff airs 83: 2 (2007) 305–317
Rehn, Olli Turkey's accession process to the EU Lecture at Helsinki University, Helsinki, 27 
November 2006. SPEECH/06/747.
Reporters sans frontières Annual Worldwide Press Freedom 
Index - 2006
http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=
639. (May 24 2007)
Reporters sans frontières Swedish photographer expelled from 
Western Sahara a day after his arrest
February 22 2007:
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=2105
9. (May 24 2007).
Reporters sans frontières. Journalists working in Western Sahara 
face assaults, arrests and harassment
June 15 2005: 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14119 
(May 24 2007).
Roth, Kenneth ‘Filling the Leadership Void: Where is 
the European Union’
Human Rights Watch World Report 2007
Schimmelfennig, F. European Regional Organizations, 
Political Conditionality, and 
Democratic Transformation in Eastern 
Europe
East European Politics and Societies 2007; 21; 
126
Smith, Karen E. The outsiders: the European 
neighbourhood policy
International Affairs 81, 4 (2005) 757-773
Solana, Javier and Patten, 
Chris. 
Wider Europe: a joint letter to the 
European Council 
http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2002-
10/Letter.pdf. (May 24 2007)
Steinmeier, Frank Walter 
and Gül, Abdullah. 
"Gemeinsam für Freiheit und Respekt" 11.02.2006:  http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews
/2006/060211-SteinmeierUndGuel.html. (May 
24 2007)
Tallberg, Jonas EU:s politiska system 2ed. Lund : Studentlitteratur, 2004
The Council of the 
European Union
Council Decision on the principles, 
priorities, intermediate objectives and 
conditions contained in the Accession
Partnership with the Republic of 
Turkey
2001/235/EC. March 23 2001. Official Journal 
of the European Communities L 85/13
The Economist The wrongs and rights of minorities Mar 17th 2005, Printed edition
- 35 -
Turkish Justice and 
Development Party (AK 
PARTi)
Party Programme Programme II 
Fundamental HR 
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramm
e.html#2.1 (May 24 2007)
Üçer, Elif Turkey’s accession to the European 
Union
Futures 38 (2006) 197–211
Verheugen, Günter EU Enlargement and the Union’s 
Neighbourhood Policy
Speech at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow. 27 
October 2003
Watt, Nicholas. Europe offers wary hand to Turkey -
Hopes and fears as EU sets date for 
accession talks
Friday December 17, 2004 - The Guardian -
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/
0,3604,1375476,00.html (May 24 2007).
Williams, Andrew EU human rights policies : a study in 
irony 
Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 2004)
Zoubir , Yahia H.   Western Sahara The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the 
World, 2e. Joel Krieger, ed. Oxford University 
Press Inc. 2001. Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ludwig.lub.lu.s
e/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t1
21.e0821 (May 27, 2007)
Treaties and Agreements
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (Official Journal of the 
European Communities. March 18 2000)
Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Treaty on European Union. (As amended by the Treaty of Nice 2001)
Treaty Establishing the European Communities (As amended by the Treaty of Nice 2001) 
Turkish Accession Negotiation Framework (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005)
The Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco
(Official Journal of the European Union May 29, 2006)
